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Posts Tagged ‘Robert Lifton’

* Israel and The Palestinians – What Now? … a new article by my friend Bob Lifton …

Posted by Lew Weinstein on May 4, 2014

Israel and The Palestinians – What Now?

israel, west bank, gaza 

Mr. Lifton’s conclusion … All that seems to be left is a slow, educational process for the Israeli public on how continued control over the Palestinians can lead to pressure for a bi-national state that will erode the Jewish and democratic values of their nation and of the Palestinians on how such control will not eventuate in their being a part of Israel, but only in losing their hope of governing themselves in their own state.

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The Past – Failed Efforts

Despite the heroic efforts of Secretary of State John Kerry and Special Envoy Martin Indyk to bring Israel and the Palestinians to agreement, the current peace process effort has failed. To understand what the future holds, it is worth looking at why the process failed and what courses of action are now available.

 As a starting point, it is abundantly clear that although we are often told that the United States can’t “want the peace more than the parties” that was indeed what happened.

While we cannot fully know what went on in the secret negotiations between Israeli negotiator, Justice Minister Tzipi Livni and Chief Palestinian Negotiator Saeb Erekat, one issue that was negotiated in the public view tells the story. At one point of time in the negotiation process, Prime Minister Netanyahu presented a new pre-condition – that the Palestinians recognize Israel as the “nation state of the Jewish people,” which became phrased as recognition as “a Jewish state.”

While one could make the argument that such recognition would reflect the willingness of the Palestinians to put an end to the conflict and live with their neighbor, it was never before a stated pre-condition to negotiations and in light of the abundant and enormously sophisticated protections being negotiated for Israel’s security, it is questionable to what extent Palestinian recognition was truly required in any event.

By raising it as an essential pre-condition, Netanyahu showed that at best his desire for a deal was not compelling, and even, as the Palestinians argued, that he was actually looking for a reason not to have to move forward on a deal.

 On the other side, was the refusal of Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian National Authority, to satisfy Netanyahu’s condition. After all, even Yasser Arafat had openly stated that peace would bring a “Palestinian and a Jewish state” living side by side. Abbas’ arguments against agreeing to recognize Israel as a Jewish state did not convince even those strongly supporting a two state solution. At the least, if Abbas truly wanted a deal he could have said he was prepared to recognize Israel as a Jewish state when all the other issues were resolved satisfactorily or indicated he would trade it off in the negotiating process.  Obviously, for whatever reason, he didn’t want a deal enough to do that.

 Other actions by each side further demonstrated that neither side was concerned with the negative reaction of the other.

All during the negotiating period, Israel continued to expand settlements, reportedly finalizing 4868 home tenders and processing plans for another 8983 homes. http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Peace-Now-Israel-issued-tenders-for-thousands-of-settler-homes-during-talks-350742. And while a number of these were in areas that were expected to be part of Israel after the final borders were established, the sheer size of the expansion and the timing of announcing new building had to be a blow to Abbas’ political standing and sent a message that the Palestinians read as showing that Israel was just using the negotiating period to expand settlements and had no real interest in a deal.

Similarly, when Abbas signed a “Reconciliation Agreement” with Hamas, the sworn enemy of Israel dedicated to its destruction, the arguments that the “technocrats” would run the joint government until elections and even that the final governing body would agree to the three principles of the Quartet (EU, UN, U.S., Russia,) including recognition of Israel and renouncing violence, not surprisingly fell on deaf Israeli ears.

 Why were both parties so reluctant to make a deal?

In both cases there were rejectionist forces acting against a deal and most importantly, both general publics – Israeli and Palestinian – were never engaged in supporting a deal. At best, they were apathetic,

 In Israel, powerful forces were aligned against a deal. These are primarily religious nationalists who make up a significant part of Israel’s governing coalition. They include members of Netanyahu’s Likud party and of the Habayit Hayehudi (Jewish Home) party, led by Naftali Bennett, who aspire to expand Israeli control over the West Bank and in some instance to annex it as part of Greater Israel. It is not clear, but those forces may also include the Russian Jewish party (Yisrael Beitenu) led by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. In order for Netanyahu to enter into an agreement with Abbas, he would have to be willing to see his governing coalition collapse and to try to form a new coalition.  While Isaac (“Bougie”) Herzog, head of the Labor Party, held out the prospect of joining such a new coalition, that was a difficult political choice for Netanyahu.

Moreover, a deal might require moving as many as 100,000 settlers from their homes at a great political and financial cost. In that context, while the polls show that most Israelis support a two state solution in theory, Israelis are mainly focused on domestic issues and there is no urgent desire to change the status quo. Under those circumstances, it is hardly surprising that despite all of Kerry’s cajoling, Netanyahu, brought up in a revisionist Zionist home, only lately come to accept a two-state solution, was not going to risk his comfortable position as Israel’s longest lasting Prime Minister to make a deal.

 For his part, Abbas faced growing opposition to a deal from those Palestinians, especially younger people, who believe their best interests lie in a bi-national state with Israel. The Palestinian public, like the Israeli public, generally show support in polls for a two state solution. But here, too, there is no public pressure to press forward with a deal. Abbas, at age 79, seeing the Oslo Agreement that he was instrumental in creating result in 400,000 Israeli settlers and seeing a very difficult negotiation ahead with no assurance of success, understandably decided to leave the problem to his successor.

The Future

In the immediate aftermath of the failed effort, Secretary Kerry’s message about future plans for the peace process contained two thoughts:  “We believe the best thing to do right now is pause, take a hard look at these things, and find out what is possible and what is not possible.” However, referring to what he called “significant progress in certain areas” Kerry stated: “What has not been laid out publicly and what I will do at some appropriate moment of time is make clear to everybody the progress that was made.” http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.588600

 There are those on the left who believe that what the Obama administration should do now is present to the parties and the international community its view of what the final status agreement should look like, covering each of the areas – Recognition of a Jewish State, borders, security, status of Jerusalem and the claim of a right of return. And perhaps that is what Kerry is suggesting.

But it is hard to see what impact this will have unless the President is prepared to put some teeth in the recommendation, and given the political cost of that course, it is highly unlikely. So laying out the Obama vision will be much along the lines of the “Clinton parameters” presented by President Bill Clinton in 2000 or the exposition by ex-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert after his 2008 negotiation with Abbas – a basis for future negotiations and discussion.

 The truth is that unless something comes along – either in the form of great pain or great benefit – that galvanizes the Israeli and Palestinian general publics to see this process as a central rather than tangential issue in their lives, nothing will happen to change the political dynamics.

Of course, nobody wants to see the pain of violence from an intifada or the costs of a collapse of the Palestinian Authority. And it is unlikely that in the near future the BDS movement (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) will have a serious impact on Israel. (See my blog “The BDS Threat To Israel: A Realistic Appraisal”http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-k-lifton/the-bds-boycott-divestmen_1_b_4818833.html

By the same token,  it is difficult to conceive of significant benefits that could be available. All that seems to be left is a slow, educational process for the Israeli public on how continued control over the Palestinians can lead to pressure for a bi-national state that will erode the Jewish and democratic values of their nation and of the Palestinians on how such control will not eventuate in their being a part of Israel, but only in losing their hope of governing themselves in their own state.

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Mr. Lifton, a businessman and political activist, is a Board Member of the Israel Policy Forum. His memoir “An Entrepreneur’s Journey: Stories From A Life In Business And Personal Diplomacy” was published by Author House in 2012.

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* Robert Lifton … an evaluation of Secretary Kerry’s efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict

Posted by Lew Weinstein on January 26, 2014

Kerry & Netanyahu 

Secretary John Kerry has devoted enormous time and effort to bring the Israelis and Palestinians together to resolve their conflict.  Recently, Israel’s Minster of Defense and a leading member of the Likud party – Moshe Ya’alon – reportedly called Kerry ‘obsessive” and “messianic” and said that Kerry “Should take his Nobel and leave us alone.” He reportedly added that a security plan drawn up by retired Marine Corps General John Allen, former American Commander of NATO–led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, as part of Kerry’s peace making effort “is not worth the paper it is written on.” Other Israeli government ministers who are leading members of the Likud party, while disapproving of Mr. Ya’alon’s choice of language, echoed similar rejectionist sentiments about Kerry’s mission. .

In light of these kinds of comment, one has to ask whether Mr. Kerry’s intense commitment to this subject is making any progress; and what are the expectations for its success and the consequences of its failure. In short, is it worth the effort?

Let’s look at where his efforts have gotten to until now. The starting point of this process was the announcement in Jordan on July 19, 2013 that Kerry had gotten both parties for the first time in three years to ”establish a basis” to start negotiations with the hope that the negotiations would reach a point beyond the “initial phase” that would allow Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to meet face to face to conclude an agreement. The first phase was given six months to produce that understanding. In December, four months into that process, after the two sides met over 20 times, and it was clear that no significant progress was achieved, Kerry announced that he would soon present the parties with a “Framework Agreement.” Kerry pointed out that the solutions to each of the core issues between the parties are known from previous negotiation rounds  – such as the negotiations in 2000 held by President Clinton and the negotiations begun at Annapolis in 2007 and continued in 2008 between then Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Mr. Abbas. He argued that it was essential to have a framework that addressed all the core issues – borders, security, refugees, Jerusalem, mutual recognition and an end of claims. And to “establish agreed guidelines for subsequent negotiations that will fill out the details in a full peace treaty.”

That Kerry has undertaken such a huge effort knowing the obstacles to success is a statement about his commitment and character. To the student of this conflict, the obstacles are more apparent than the path to success. The Palestinian leadership is weak and Hamas, which is still controlling the Gaza, is opposed to any deal that Israel might accept. However, I have always believed that the power to make a break a deal lies with Israel. And neither the political leadership of Israel nor the Israeli people are demonstrating a deep commitment to a deal with the Palestinians. It has taken a long time, but Prime Minister Netanyahu has finally adopted some of the language of those who are pressing for a peace deal by acknowledging that his desire to make a deal is based on ensuring that Israel does not risk becoming a bi-national state. Still, as the process has moved along he has elevated the emphasis on two demands that his predecessors – and even he, until recently, did not make overt conditions.  One is that in any peace deal, the Palestinians acknowledge that Israel is a “Jewish State” and the second, related to the first is that the Palestinians stop “incitements” to violence and teach their young students to recognize the existence of Israel.  To be sure, there is ample support for the proposition that Israel is a Jewish state, including the 1947 UN Resolution for Partition that calls for a “Jewish state.”  And other Israeli leaders have mentioned the concept without elevating it to a condition. Still, Secretary Kerry has accepted that condition as one of the basic deliverables in a deal between the parties. On the other hand, it is difficult to condition a deal on a course of action that stops “incitement” in a sufficiently provable manner.

The fact is that in any deal Mr. Netanyahu would face serious problems, political and social. The political problem is clear: the present governing coalition could not hold together under a deal with the Palestinians. The Habayit Hayehudi party, for example led by Naftali Bennet is irreconcilably opposed to the West Bank becoming a Palestinian state. Even the centrist leader of the Yesh Atid party – Yair Lapid – has publicly stated his unwillingness to share Jerusalem as a capital with a Palestinian state, although that may be more manageable. To help Netanyahu with the problem of continuing to govern, Secretary Kerry has asked Isaac “Bougie” Herzog who recently became head of the Labor Party and Leader of the opposition to support Netanyahu if his coalition frayed because of a peace deal. Herzog agreed to do that.

Another problem involves moving settlers out of the areas that would be turned over to the Palestinian state. The best estimate is that any anticipated deal would require moving as many as 100,000 settlers. And even though many of those settlers would be prepared to move, we have seen that there are a hard core of settlers that would fight any effort, including one by the by Israel military to move them.

Moreover, popular support for a two-state solution by Israelis as well as Palestinians is waning. The most recent Pew Survey of Israelis and Palestinian show that although a majority of both would approve a deal there is a declining support from both for a two state solution..

On the other hand there are strong incentives for Israel to make a deal. For Israel, the only alternatives to a two state solution are either a bi-national state, which means adding to its citizenry a large Palestinian population or an effort to continue what the UN characterizes as an “occupation” of Palestinian territory. Including a large and faster growing Palestinian population in a broader Israel would end the character of Israel as a “Jewish” state, and an effort to retain that Jewish character by disenfranchising the Palestinian population would end its democratic status. That, or continued “occupation” will inevitably lead to a challenge of Israel as an apartheid state which as was demonstrated in the case of South Africa can bring with it great costs. We are already witnessing efforts to pressure Israel using threats of boycott, divestments and sanctions. Whatever his view of the Palestinians, as partners for peace, Prime Minister Netanyahu, like his Likud nurtured predecessors – Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert – clearly has grasped the need for Israel to avoid a bi-national state.

The other incentive for Israel to complete a two state deal has to do with countering the threat from Iran.  As I noted in my memoirs, even as early as 1993 the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shared with me his strategic vision that to best be able to counter Iranian ambitions, Israel should make peace with its neighbors, including ending the conflict with the Palestinians.  Additional potential value in that connection for Israel lies in the possibility of its joining forces with Sunni states, led by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States in a coalition against Iranian hegemony in the region if Israel resolved the Palestinian issue. This is a message delivered to me and three other Jewish leaders by leading Saudi officials some years ago. It is also reflected in the recent willingness of the Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, to expand   the kind of territorial deal that would meet the requirements of the Arab Peace Initiative to include the 1967 borders with land swaps. That initiative, which was led by Saudi King Abdullah, stated Arab willingness to accept Israel as a neighbor with full political social and economic relationships if it completed a deal with the Palestinians. .

Of course, a failure of the Kerry effort would leave Israel exposed not only to the possibility of a resurgence of Palestinian violence but, probably more threatening to the well being of its citizens, to an intense international effort at expanding the boycott, divestment and sanctions programs through the UN and outside of it.  It would also mean the failed opportunity to join forces in an anti-Iran coalition with Arab states that could be of significant value to Israel. And if, after all of his intense effort and commitment, Kerry were to fail in this mission, it is highly doubtful that the two-state solution would be considered a viable approach to resolving the conflict. Under these circumstances, it is clear that anyone who cares deeply about Israel and its future as a Jewish homeland should be applauding Mr. Kerry’s efforts as he pursues his difficult task.

Mr. Lifton’s memoirs, “An Entrepreneur’s Journey: Stories From a Life in Business and Personal Diplomacy,” was published by AuthorHouse in 2012.

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